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III. Statement of Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(e).
IV. Statement of Issues Presented for Review
Whether evidence of Mr. Martinez' prior conviction of assault by a prisoner was
improperly admitted into evidence.
V. Standard of Review
Challenges to the admission of evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) is reviewed
on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Saunders, 1999 Utah 57, at ^[18.
VI. Citations to Determinative Statutes
Utah Rule of Evidence 401.
Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.
Utah Rule of Evidence 402,
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other
rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Utah Rule of Evidence 403.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Rule of Evidence 404.
***

(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words,
evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and
meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
VII. Statement Concerning Addendum
The text of the relevant and determinative evidentiary rules are set forth above.
Furthermore, there are no challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusion of law,
memorandum decisions, oral decisions, contract or other document subject to construction
relevant to this appeal. Other than the Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings - Jury Trial which
should be considered in its entirety and which is oart of the record on appeal, there are no other
parts of the record which are cf central importance in this case. As such, no addendum as
required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(l 1) is required.
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VIII. Statement of Facts
Mr. Martinez was charged in a one count information with the crime of assault by a
prisoner in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5. Record, ("R'% at p. 4-5. That matter was
tried to a jury on October 5, 2000. See, R., at 159 (Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings - Jury
Trial). Having considered the evidence of the parties and following deliberation, the jury found
Mr. Martinez guilty as charged. R., at 119.
The State's only witness offered in support of the allegation was Daniel Terry. See., R.,
at 159 (Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings - Jury Trial). Terry was the alleged victim and also
an officer at the Salt Lake County Metro Jail where the incident took place. R., 159, p. 64, 47.
Terry testified that on June 10th, 1999. he was working as a floor officer in section 7 of the jail.
Id., at 65. As floor officer. Terry was responsible for making sure all of the inmates in his
section were following the rules. Id.
According to Terry, at approximately 1) :00 p.m., he and another officer started a head
count - a procedure designed to make sure no one was missing. Id., at 65-66. During the head
count, the officer will direct all of the inmates in a particular section to go from their cells into
the day room. Id,, at 67. Orxe all of the inmate are in the day room, the officers will conduct the
count. Id.
On June 10th, 1999, ^erry testified that as he started the head count he noticed that Mr.
Martinez did not have his jumpsuit over his shoulders but instead pulled down around this waist.
Id, at 68. Mr. Martinez testified that he had the jump suit rolled down to his waist because the
suit gave him a rash. Id.,, at 160. In fact, the Jail medical personnel gave Mr. Martinez
permission to wear a tee shirt for that very reason. Id, at 160. This concerned Terry because,
4
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-

"It's in the prisoners' rules and handbooks that you ll lemu^* lull) dressed at all times." Id., at
68. Stated another way, Mr. Terry observed that Mr, Martinez was breaking one of those rules
that I CITY was chat ged to ei iforce.
When ' 1 erry saw that Mi Martinez did not have his jumpsuit up he ordered Mr. Martinez
;;imp-P -• • Id, at at > :>'

to get

uenuiinL: :- L:.>

Martinez merely looked at him

and kept walking. KL at 69. When Mr. Martinez did not immediately respond to Terry's
command, Terry ordered Mi , Martinez to "get you jumpsuit i lp now." Id., at 69. At that point
I err> testified t! tat • It Mai til lez pi it 1 lis ji u i if: si lit oi i as i equested

I i , at 69.

Shortly thereafter as the inmates were making their way to the Ju\ room. S e m MCM. J
someone say, "flicking Elvis, fuck you," 1 ! J ai 71
z- :>i i n i: lei it. Even though Terry was i K >t su*

I erry was unclear about w ho made the

'••> i iia.de ll le coi i n i lent 1 le ordered h li f1' - lartii lez

aside to speak will\ h i m / Terry pulled Mr. Martinez aside because, "also in the prisoners'
regulations ai id i ules handbook it

in tl lere that no fci il and abi isive lai iguage will be used and

you will address officers and staff at the jail courteously." Id., 72-73. Once Terry had Mr.
Martinez aside, he told him, "I don't know what you problem is, you need to follow the rules at

1
2

Elvis is Mi
()

|,'M."

• ,- • „.

a 71.

"Did you see who yelled those profanities?"

A. ' i didn't ^ee - I wasn't in front of anybody that I thought yelled the
profanities. When I - ) was watching Martinez as he was walking in and his
mouth was going and he had sort of turned and looked and then turned back and I
was sort of watching the side of his face and his mouth was moving when I heard
the profanities yelled." Id., at 70-71
3

It is very odd that Teny could be looking at Mr. Martinez, hear the comment, see Mr.
Martinez mouth move all while standing only twelve feet awa} and ;•• -..M ! *• MPC who made
the comment, assuming the comment was made at all.
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all times. I'm not the officer not to be following the rules with, 'cause I go by the book . . . . " At
that point, according to Terry, Mr. Martinez stood up. Id., at 75. Terry then put his hand up and
directed Mr. Martinez to sit down. Id., at 75. Terry testified that Mr. Martinez then grabbed
Terry by the shirt. Id. Thereafter, a scuffle ensued during which time Mr. Martinez attempted to
strike Terry. Ultimately, Terry was able to subdue Mr. Martinez. IdL, at 76-81. Based on the
forgoing evidence, the State rested.

^

In response to the State's evidence, Mr. Martinez called three witnesses. The first witness
for the defense was Michael Toledo. Mr. Toledo was an inmate in Metro Jail on the evening of the alleged assault. Id, at 128. According to Mr. Toledo, he was playing cards with Mr.
Martinez just before Terry called for the head count. Id., at 129. When the count was called Mr.
Toledo and Mr. Martinez began to move from their cell to the day room. Id., at 131-32. As Mr.
Toledo and Mr. Martinez were moving toward the day room Mr. Toledo testified that he heard
Terry order Mr. Martinez to pull up his jumpsuit. Id., at 132. At that point it appeared that Terry
was upset with Mr. Martinez because he was not walking fast enough and because he did not
immediately pull up his jumpsuit. Id, at 132-33. Mr. Toledo heard Terry curse at Mr. Martinez
and order him to get his suit up. Id,, at 133. In response, Mr. Toledo heard Mr. Martinez tell
Terry that he had clearance to wear his jumpsuit in that fashion. Id, at 137. Terry then grabbed
Mr. Martinez by the arm and lead him into the hallway wear the scuffle occurred.
Mr. Toledo described that Terry lead Mir. Martinez by the arm into a hallway which is
separated from the common area by a door. Id, at 134. The door has a big window through
which one could see the hallway. Id., at 134. Immediately after Terry took Mr. Martinez into the
hallway, Mr. Toledo took a spot by the door so he could see what was happening. Id, at 135. As
6
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i
grabbed V
Terry !• ion

'*

Mai tinez ' I ' 21 1 ;; > then

V t \ -r . v\ tv (XK k ^\ \ acck and pushed his face 111' * * a blue seat. Id., at 135,
1

PUM.^'

s.. w:

.

• . •

.me several other officers

arrived to offer assistance. According to Mi I oledo, Mr. Martinez never grabbed 1 erry and
never took a swing at him. Id.
Fii lally I /It 1 4a:t tin lez testified it 11 lis 0" vn defei ise Mi I" • Ia::t t:i:i lez testified tl lat 1 lie is
seventeen years old, is approximately 5' 8" a n ! that he \\c\v.U * \ M) pounds, Id., ai ; - s
testimony was presumably offered ii1 coiltm-a I erry's build which IK de.^ 1 ilvu a>

;

*
i

'0

poi 11 ids Id., at 86 1^ 4i Martii lez coi ifii 1 1 ted tl lat t le was ii 1 N letro Jail 01 1 tl le 1 light of til :i.e
occurrence iha; ai approximately I 1:()() p,n1 he was called o a **•; h« .id eouni. aiui that left his
• .' - iumnsi lit aro\ md his waist. Id,, at 1 '

^! •

tinez irun„e T >:i:i 1 the

cell toward the day room lie dialed that ferry told him u,. Rwh tip youi fucking jumpsuit." Id.,
y 1 r1

M Martinez did . ' 'mmediately respond because he was somewhat taken back by the

uggiv- !--.

v *• -

;

.

•

IV lai tii lez j 1 1st looked at 1 'err)/ \ vl 10 agaii 1 01 dei e cl

that Mr. Martinez pull up his jumpsuit. Id, I blowing the second instruction Mr. Martinez
p«. ..;,. -j . . | japMni J:-, ae :ic;uiee. inuaiiisi.v •: r' room. IdL
Whei 1 Mr. Martinez was just inside the day room door, 1 erry instructed hin 1 to come out
ii ito the hall with hii 11. IdL at 162. Consistent with \h Toledo's testinuun. Mr. Martinez denied
every :::i n sing at 'I-:i1 y Ic I , "I Ic >i it: theless, 1 e:t t ] ' pi lysicalh f escorted f \\ Mai tii lez ii ito tl le 1: mlh v a;; •
Id., at 163. When Mi Martinez was in the hallway the door between the hallway and the
common area closed \K l, -

•. = • .inr -^ ^at H—•» - . ilic beiu h Id. \s Mr. Martinez sat on the

bench I erry leaned down about a foot away I: t 01 1 1 Mi , Mai tii iez' face ai id a s k e d if fv It ! 4ai tii lez
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wanted a piece of him. Id., at 164. Mr. Martinez responded, "what the hell did I do?" Id, at
165. Terry again posed the same question to Mr. Martinez to which Mr. Martinez gave the same
answer. Id. With this second exchange Mr. Martinez began to feel uncomfortable and tried to
scoot down the bench away from Terry. Id., at 165 - 66. As Mr. Martinez started to move away
from Terry, Terry stood up and started coming toward Mr. Martinez. At this point Mr. Martinez
also stood up and took a step back from Terry. Id., at 167. Terry then grabbed Mr. Martinez by
both shoulders, ordered him to sit down and then physically pushed him into a seated position on
the bench. Id, at 168. Mr. Martinez responded by telling Terry to, "keep his fucking hands off
[him]. Id. This apparently further upset Terry who then struck Mr. Martinez in the nose. Id, at
169. After Terry hit Mr. Martinez, Mr. Martinez tried to get up off the bench and get away from
Terry. Id, at 170. Terry and Mr. Martinez then wrestled around until Terry was able to handcuff
and subdue Mr. Martinez. Id, at 117 - 73. Mr. Martinez testified that he did not grab Terrj^shirt
and that he did not take a swing at him. Id, at 174.
On cross examination, the third question the State posed to Mr. Martinez was, "Now,
you're in jail because of being convicted of a crime; is that right?" Id, at 175. Following the
affirmative response, the State asked, "In fact, you've been convicted - " at which point defense
counsel asked to approach the bench. Id, at 176. Following an off the record discussion, the
following exchange took Txacei
Q.

"So, you're in jail for a conviction of a crime of assault by a prisoner, are you
not."

A.

Yes. I am.

Q.

So, you beat someone up, in a correctional facility; is that right?

8
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A.

Yes.

Id, at 176.
The State then closed its examination of Mr. Martinez with the following series of
questions:
Q.

That's what it seems like. You're just an innocent victim?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

An innocent victim with a prior felony conviction; right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

An innocent victim with a prior felony conviction for assault by a prisoner; is that
right?

A.

Yes.

Id, at 179.
Following the presentation of the defense, Mr. Martinez offered into evidence Defense
Exhibit 2 by stipulation. Id., at 181. Defense Exhibit 2 is the medical evaluation form which
demonstrating the injuries Mr. Martinez suffered in the incident which include, a laceration on
Mr. Martinez nose, three contusions on his forehead, multiple contusions on the chest, contusions
on the shoulder and arm, and swelling of Mr. Martinez' right wrist. Defendant's Exhibit 2.
During its closing argument, the State relied on the evidence it elicited concerning Mr.
Martinez prior conviction stating, "You heard the defendant admit he's also a convicted felon,
assault by a prisoner. He's predisposed to commit these crimes - " IdL, at 211. Trial counsel
objected to the statement arguing that the evidence of the prior conviction could only be used as
impeachment evidence and not substantively. Id., at 211. Although the judge sustained the
9
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<

objection he did not give a limiting instruction to the jury. Id., at 211.
Following the presentation of the case, the jury took the matter under advisement and,
thereafter, returned a verdict of guilty. R., at 119.
VIII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
During the trial of this matter the State offered and the trail court received evidence
concerning the fact that the defendant previously committed the crime of assault by a prisoner.
The trial court erred in accepting this evidence because 1) the evidence was offered to prove
nothing other than the fact that Mr. Martinez has a propensity to commit crime in violation of
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b), 2) the evidence did not go to any fact which was of consequence
and, therefore was not relevant pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 402, and 3) the probative
value of the evidence was vastly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice in violation of
Utah Rule of Evidence 403. Although the admission of the prior conviction may not have been
sufficiently documented in the record, the issue is properly before the court due to the obvious
nature of the error or, in the alternative, the ineffective assistance of counsel for not preserving
the record. As a result of the foregoing errors, Mr. Martinez right to a fair trial and to the due
process of law were infringed.
IX. ARGUMENT
Mr. Martinez*constitutionally protected right to the due process of law was infringed by
the admission of evidence concerning a prior conviction of assault by a prisoner. Every
defendant is vested with the Constitutionally protected right to require the State to prove each
element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
As the Utah Supreme Court noted in State v. Saunders, 1999 Utah 59, at f 15, that right can be
10
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jeopardized by the admission of prior bad acts because such evidence "may have such a powerful
tendency to mislead the finder of fact as to subvert the constitutional principle that a defendant
may be convicted only if guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a specific crime charged." Thus it
has become "fundamental in our law that a person may be convicted criminally only for his acts,
not for his general character. That principle is violated if a conviction is based on an inference
that conviction is justified because of the defendant's criminal character or propensity to commit
bad acts." Id
The rule excluding admission of prior crimes is governed by Utah Rule of Evidence
404(b) which provides, "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under
this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of
Rules 402 and 403."
The Utah Supreme Court recently defined the proper analysis which must be used to
determine what evidence is and is not admissible under 404(b). See, State v. Decorso, 1999 Utah
57. In Decorso, the Court held that in order to admit evidence of a prior crime the trial court
must conduct a three part test. Decorso, at f 20. First, the court must determine whether the
evidence is being offered for a proper non-character purpose. If the court determines that the
evidence of the prior crime is being offered only to show the defendant's propensity to commit
crime, then the analysis stops and the evidence must be excluded. If the court finds that the
proposed evidence is being offered for a proper non-character purpose it must then make a
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determination concerning whether the proposed evidence is relevant under Utah Rule of
Evidence 402. Under Rule 402, as further clarified by Rule 401, only evidence which has a
tendency to make material fact more or less probable shall be admissible. Only if the court finds
that the proposed evidence of the prior crime is relevant can it move the final step in the analysis
which is to determine whether the existence of the crime at issue meets the requirements of Rule
403. Under Utah Rule of Evidence 403, although relevant, evidence that has a probative value

ii

that is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice must be excluded. Applying
the foregoing analysis to the fact of this case shows that the trial court erred in admitting the
evidence concerning Mr. Martinez'prior conviction.
A.

\&

The Evidence of Mr. Martinez Prior Conviction Should Have Been Excluded
Under Rules of Evidence 404(b). 402 and 403.

The evidence of Mr. Martinez/ prior conviction of assault by a prisoner should have been
excluded because it fails each of the three Decorso tests. First, as evidenced by the record, the
only reason the State offered evidence of Mr. Martinez prior conviction was to prove his
propensity to commit assault. Second, even if there was some proper purpose for offering the
evidence it is simply not relevant to any of the essential elements of the crime charged. Finally,
under any analysis the non-existent probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed
by its prejudicial effect.
1•

Mr. Martinez Prior Conviction Should Have Been Excluded Under 404(b).

Evidence of Mr. Martinez' prior conviction should have been excluded because it was
offered for an improper purpose. The plain language of Rule 404(b) specifically excludes
evidence that is offered to prove the defendant's propensity to commit crime. See also, Decorso,

12
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at Tf 21. What is patently clear from the record is that the State offered the evidence of the prior
conviction for precisely for that reason. Indeed, during the State's closing argument that is
exactly what it told the jury. Specifically, ibe State argued, "You heard the defendant admit he's
also a convicted felon, assault by a prisoner. He's predisposed to commit these crimes - " R, at
159 (Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings - Jury Trial) p. 21 ]. As is evidenced by the State's
own argument, it is clear that the evidence of Mr. Martinez prior conviction was offered for the
sole reason of proving that "He's predisposed to commit these crimes." Given that the evidence
was offered for an improper purpose it should never have been allowed into evidence.
Going beyond the fact that the State offered the evidence for an improper purpose,
arguing that Mr. Martinez' is predisposed to commit "these crimes" is, in and of itself, is grounds
to reverse the conviction Indeed, the Saunders Court expressly held,
Anchoring the orincinle that prior crime evidence is not admissible to show
criminal propensity is the more fundamental principle that a prosecutor may never
argue or suggest to the finder of fact, erher directly or indirectly, that a defendant
should be convicted because of his criminal character or that he was guilty of the
crime charged because he acted in accord with a criminal propensity shown by
such evidence. This is true regardless of whether that evidence was properly or
erroneously admitted. A prosecutor who intentionally calls to jurors' attention
matters :;hat ibev sconM not consider in reaching a verdict is clearly guilty of
misconduct, particularly when a prosecutor .urgues prior bad acts or prior criminal
conduct as a basis for convicting.
State v. Sauders. at %2- <dnn2 S;^e.y:.En?mett, S39 P 2d 781, 785-86 (Utah 1992); State v.
Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1363, .1372-"'3 :>;ah 1986)), S a b e r s provides clear and black letter law
requiring that this case be revised.
Additionally, there i- no iegh?mate reason evaiiable to show Mr. Martinez' prior
conviction was offereJ to a r non-character purpose. Utah Rale or Evidence 404(b) allows for
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i

the admission of prior crimes to order to prove, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absent of mistake or accident. Clearly, none of those reasons exist in this

i

case. There is no dispute in this case that there was a scuffle between Mr. Martinez and Terry at
the Metro Jail. Therefore, opportunity and identity are not at issue. See, State v. Johnson, 748
P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987)(Defendant put identity at issue by arguing he was not the one who forged
the check at issue.) Similarly, as Mr. Martinez denied every having assaulted or attempting to

?M

assault Terry, knowledge and intent are not available to admit the prior crime. See, State v.

?m%

Brown, 577 P.2d 135 (Utah 1978)(Defendant put knowledge and intent at issue by claiming that
he was innocently caught up in his son's criminal activity); State v. Ramirez, 942 P.2d 366 (Utah
App 1996)(Defendant put intent at issue by defending on the ground that was innocently
involved in drug activity.) Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest Mr. Martinez left his cell
with an organized plan to assault Terry. As such, preparation and plan are not available to admit
Mr. Martinez prior conviction. Finally, nothing about the prior crime speaks to the issue of
motive. The evidence of Mr. Martinez' prior conviction was offered for the State's express
purpose which was to prove Mr. Martinez has a propensity to commit crimes. As such, it is
patently inadmissible and should have been excluded.
2.

Mr. Martinez' Prior Conviction Should Have Been Excluded Under 402.

In addition to being inadmissible under 404(b), Mr. Martinez prior conviction is also
inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence Rule 402. Rule 402 exclude all evidence that is not
relevant. What constitutes relevant evidence is defined by Rule 401 which provides, "'Relevant
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact which is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would to be
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without the evidence." In this case, Mr. Martinez was charged with assault by a prisoner in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5. Because Mr. Martinez' prior conviction does not
tend to prove or disprove any of the essential element of the crime of assault by a prisoner it is
irrelevant and should have been excluded.
The only facts that are relevant at trial to prove that Mr. Martinez committed the crime of
assault by a prisoner are; 1) whether Mr. Martinez committed an assault, 2) with the intent to
cause bodily injury, 3) while he was a prisoner. State v. Duran, 733 P.2d 982 (Utah App.
1989)(citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5). In support of the charge, the State argued below
that Mr. Martinez grabbed Terry and took a swing at him. In defense of the charge, Mr. Martinez
argued that he did not grab or try to hit Terry. Thus, in this case the only facts which are of
consequence are whether or not Mr. Martinez grabbed or attempted hit Terry. As Mr. Martinez
prior conviction has not bearing on that issue, other than to prove is propensity to commit crime,
it is irrelevant and should have been excluded on that basis.
3.

Mr. Martinez' Prior Conviction Should Have Been Excluded Under 403.

Finally, the evidence of Mr. Martinez prior conviction should have been excluded under
Rule 403 because its limited, if not non-existent, probative value is substantially outweighed by
its prejudicial effect. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . .." Utah Rule of Evidence 403; See
also, State v. Decorso, (Utah 1999). "Under a Rule 403 analysis, the trial court may find
evidence to be unfairly prejudicial, and therefore inadmissible, if it appeals to the jury's
sympathies, arouses a sense of horror, provokes the instinct to punish, or otherwise may cause the
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jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions of the case." State
v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1996)(citing Carter v. Hewitt. 617 F.2d 961, 972-73 (3d
Cir.1980) (citation omitted); State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989)(internal quotations
omitted). As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Saunders, evidence of a prior crime has a
powerful tendency to move the jury to convict on grounds other than those which are issue in the
case. State v. Saunders, 1999 Utah 59, at ]f 15. *"[I]n reaching a decision whether to exclude
[evidence] on the grounds of unfair prejudice,'

M

the trial court may also consider " '[t]he

availability of other means of proof [as] an appropriate factor.'" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
475 (Utah 1988) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 403 advisory committee's note).
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the fact of this case it is evident that the
minimal probative value of the prior conviction is far outweighed by the harmful and prejudicial
effects of its admission. As noted above, there is little if anything that the prior conviction adds
to proving that Mr. Martinez committed the crime of assault by a prisoner. Indeed, the only
reason it was offered seems to be to prove that Mr. Martinez has a propensity to commit "crimes
like these." As such, the evidence can do nothing other than inflame the jury and lead them to
conclude that Mr. Martinez is a hardened criminal who guilt is evident by his combative nature.
Because it is precisely that type of evidence that Rule 403 is designed to prevent and because
there is no probative value associate with the prior conviction, that evidence should have been
excluded under Rule 403.
In this case, the admission of evidence of Mr. Martinez' prior conviction was improper
because it was offered for an improper purpose, it was irrelevant to any fact which was of
consequence to the proceedings and because its probative value was substantially outweighed by
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the danger of unfair prejudice.
B.

The Evidence of Mr. Martinez Prior Conviction. Constitutes Plain Error Or, In
TI lc Alternative, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

As noted abo\e. the evidence «>i Mr Martinez prior coiiviction was erroneous. However,
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error below is sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.
2.

Trial Counsel's Failure To Object To The Admission Of The Prior
Conviction Constitutes Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

To bring a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, "a defendant must show that
trial counsel's performance was deficient in that it Tell below an objective standard of
reasonableness,' and that the deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial." State v.
Garrett 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App.1993) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). In determining whether counsel's
performance was deficient, "we must 'indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be
considered sound trial strategy."'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065
(citation omitted)); accord State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App.1993). To establish
prejudice under Strickland, the defendant must show that, "but for the deficient representation,
there is a 'reasonable probability' that the result would have been different." State v. Hall 946
P.2d 712, 719 (Utah App.1997) (citation omitted), cert denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998).
Prejudice will not be presumed, see Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522-23 (Utah 1994), and if
the defendant fails to establish prejudice, "we need not determine whether counsel's performance
was [in fact] deficient," State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).
Under the first prong of the Strickland test there can be little doubt trial counsel's failure
to object to the admission of the prior conviction was deficient. Although counsel is granted a
broad range of discretion in formulating trial strategy, there is simply no benefit or advantage to
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error from the bench or whether the error rests exclusively with trial counsel, Mr. Martinez was
prejudiced by the admission of his prior conviction.
X. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully request the Court reverse the judgment
below and remand this case for further proceedings.
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